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This paper has investigated the patterns of inequality that have emerged in rural 
Bangladesh in the decade of the 2000s. Two findings stand out clearly–
distribution of income has become more unequal over the decade, and, 
somewhat surprisingly, distribution of consumption has remained more or less 
unchanged despite widening income inequality. The main analytical task of the 
paper was to search for the underlying causes responsible for these two 
apparently contradictory trends. The root of widening income inequality was 
found to lie in the unequalising effects of foreign remittance, and to a lesser 
extent, that of income from self-employment in non-agricultural activities. 
These two sources of income were also the driving force behind rapid growth 
of the rural economy. This poses a trade-off between growth and equity, which 
the policymakers need to resolve – for example, by making foreign migration 
more affordable to people of small means. Our explanation of how 
consumption inequality remained stable in the face of widening income 
inequality turns on the consumption smoothing effect of microcredit. The 
hypothesis is that consumption inequality did not rise because people at the 
lower end of the income scale were able to enjoy higher levels of consumption 
at given levels of income thanks to the relaxation of liquidity constraint made 
possible by the rapid expansion of microcredit. The hypothesis was validated 
by examining the nature of consumption functions at the two ends of the 
decade.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In many developing countries, recent upsurge in growth has been 
accompanied by rising inequality even as poverty has declined, and Bangladesh 
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is no exception in this regard (Milanovic 2005, Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007, 
Khan 2005, Bhattacharya and Khan 2008). For a long time the idea that growth 
was prone to be associated with rising equality–—known as the Kuznets 
hypothesis–—was generally accepted as an inevitable feature of the development 
process, until research since the 1970s began to cast doubt on the theoretical and 
empirical validity of the hypothesis (Kanbur 2000). However, the spectre of 
Kuznets seems to be coming back with a vengeance in the wake of the most 
recent experience of rising inequality across much of the developing world. 
Rising inequality raises concern not only about the poverty-reducing effect of 
growth here and now, but also about the prospect of poverty reduction in the 
future.1 Understanding the changing pattern of inequality and its underlying 
forces has, therefore, become ever more important.  
The present paper looks at the trend of inequality in rural Bangladesh and 
comes up with two major findings: (1) inequality in the distribution of income 
has been rising consistently at least since the early 1990s, and (2) inequality in 
the distribution of consumption expenditure has, however, remained remarkably 
stable in the recent years. The objective of the paper is to investigate the forces 
underlying these two apparently inconsistent trends. 
Data on the recent trends of inequality are presented in Section II. An in-
depth examination of the forces underlying the trend of rising income inequality 
is also undertaken in this section. It is shown there that the unequalising 
influences of foreign remittance and income from self-employment in non-
agricultural activities have been the main drivers of rising inequality in rural 
Bangladesh. In section III, we attempt to explain the puzzling phenomenon that 
consumption inequality has remained stable in the face of rising income 
inequality. The hypothesis we offer focuses on the easing of the liquidity 
constraint made possible by the microcredit revolution in rural Bangladesh. A 
summary of the findings and some concluding remarks are offered in section IV. 
II. RECENT TRENDS OF INEQUALITY IN RURAL BANGLADESH 
The successive rounds of Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) 
carried out by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics are the primary source of data 
on the distribution of income and consumption expenditure in Bangladesh. 
Although questions remain about the quality of data, these are the best large-
scale representative data sets available in Bangladesh. More importantly, the data 
                                                 
1Recent research has shown that higher inequality may lead to slower growth, other 
things remaining the same, and thereby hamper the prospect of poverty reduction in the 
future (Ravallion 2009). 
Osmani & Sen:  Inequality in Rural Bangladesh in the 2000s 3 
of different rounds of HIES are generally comparable, so that as long as the 
nature of biases remain unchanged one can have a reasonable degree of 
confidence in the nature of change revealed by these surveys, if not in the levels 
of variables at any point in time. After a careful scrutiny of the HIES data, Khan 
(2005) generated a series of estimates of inequality in both income and 
consumption distributions for the period between 1991/92 and 2005. We have 
updated this series for rural Bangladesh by using data from a large-scale 
household survey carried out in 2010 under the Dynamics of Rural Poverty 
Project of the Institute of Microfinance, Dhaka.2,3 The resulting trend of 
inequality in rural Bangladesh is presented in Table I.  
A couple of features of the evolving trend stand out immediately. First, the 
rising trend in income inequality that started in the early 1990s continued 
unabated in the last decade. As measured by the Gini coefficient, income 
inequality has increased from 0.35 in 2000 to 0.46 in 2010.4
Second, in complete contrast to income inequality, consumption inequality 
has not changed at all in the last decade, with the Gini coefficient of consumption 
distribution remaining stable at around 0.28.5 In both these respects, our findings 
for 2010 do not spring any surprises–—they merely confirm that the trends that 
were observed in the first half of the last decade continued in the second half as 
well. Other measures of inequality also tell the same story.6
The stability of consumption inequality has played a critical role in making 
possible the observed acceleration in poverty reduction in the last decade despite 
sharp increase in income inequality, because in standard practice poverty is 
measured with reference to consumption rather than income. But the fact that 
                                                 
2 The sample for this survey comprised of 6,300 households drawn from all over rural 
Bangladesh following a methodology very similar to that employed by HIES. For details 
of the sampling methodology and some general findings of the survey, see Osmani et al. 
(2011). 
3 BBS has also carried out a round of HIES for 2010. We have not been able to use it, 
however, as the detailed data set is not yet available. Some summary statistics have been 
published in BBS (2011), and we have referred to them wherever appropriate. 
4 For comparison, BBS (2011) found the Gini coefficient of rural income distribution in 
2010 to be 0.43. 
5 BBS (2011) confirms this picture, as it finds the Gini coefficient of rural consumption 
distribution in 2010 to be 0.275. 
6 Since inequality can be measured by a variety of measures, it is important to see 
whether all the inequality measures tell the same story. In total we considered 12 
inequality measures—ranging from the more conventional Gini index to Theil index, and 
Atkinson measure of inequality. All the measures tell roughly the same story. See 
Osmani et al. (2011), chapter 3. 
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rising inequality in income has been accompanied by stable inequality in 
consumption is a puzzling phenomenon–—one that has not yet been fully 
explained. We shall comment on this puzzle–—and offer a plausible hypothesis 
to explain it – later in this paper (Section III), but first we shall explore a bit more 
deeply the phenomenon of widening income inequality itself. 
TABLE I 
EVOLUTION OF INEQUALITY IN RURAL BANGLADESH: 1991/92 – 2010 
(Gini coefficient) 
Distribution of 1991/92 1995/96 2000 2005 2010 
Per capita income 0.276 0.310 0.365 0.404 0.465 
Per capita consumption 0.249 0.277 0.281 0.280 0.291 
Notes and Sources: The figures for 2010 are our own estimates based on InM Poverty 
Dynamics Survey 2010; the earlier figures are from Khan (2005). 
Widening Income Inequality: Searching for the Underlying Causes 
While examining the nature of widening income inequality in rural 
Bangladesh, an important point to consider is whether this phenomenon afflicts 
some particular segments of the population more than others, for that might 
provide a clue as to the underlying forces behind widening inequality. For this 
purpose, we divided up the rural population into several groups by a number of 
alternative criteria–—namely, occupation, landownership class, educational 
status and location. The results are reported in Tables II-V. Each table provides 
two types of information. First, it shows how the Gini coefficient of income 
distribution of each group changed between 2000 and 2010. This piece of 
information would help identify whether certain groups have become more 
unequal than others. Second, for each of the two years, we break up rural 
inequality into two parts–—one part showing the contribution of inequality 
within groups and the other part showing the contribution of inequality between 
groups.7 This piece of information will help to figure out whether the widening 
of inequality that is observed in rural Bangladesh came about primarily through 
widening of inequality within groups or between groups. That too might offer a 
clue as to the underlying causes. 
Looking first at the occupational groups, we find that inequality increased for 
each of the major occupational groups–—regardless of whether the households 
were engaged in agriculture or non-agricultural activities or depended on other 
                                                 
7 For the latter purpose, we used a Generalised Entropy Index of inequality, which can be 
readily decomposed into “within” and “between” components, rather than the Gini 
coefficient, which cannot be decomposed in this way. 
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sources of income,8 and regardless of whether they were self-employed or wage-
employed (Table II). There is a difference in degree, however. At one end of the 
scale were households engaged in self-employment in non-agriculture, who 
experienced the sharpest increase in inequality–—for them the Gini coefficient 
increased by 15 percentage points compared to 10 percentage points for the rural 
population as a whole. At the other end were casual wage labourers, in both 
agriculture and non-agriculture, for whom the Gini coefficient increased by only 
3-4 percentage points. 
TABLE II 
INCOME INEQUALITY WITHIN OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS: 2000-2010 
Gini Coefficient by Household Head’s Occupation 2000 2010 
Self-employment in agriculture 0.36 0.45 
Casual labour in agriculture 0.26 0.29 
Self-employment in non-agriculture 0.36 0.51 
Casual labour in non-agriculture 0.27 0.31 
Salaried work in non-agriculture 0.37 0.43 
Others 0.41 0.50 
All 0.37 0.47 
Decomposition of Entropy Index GE(2) (%)   
Within groups  93.9 96.1 
Between groups 6.1 3.9 
Sources: The figures for 2010 are our own estimates based on InM Poverty Dynamics Survey 
2010, and the figures for 2000 were calculated by us from the raw data file of HIES 
2000. 
Notes:      GE(2) is a member of the class of Generalised Entropy measures of inequality–—it is 
equal to the half the square of coefficient of variation. 
Dividing the population by landownership class, we find once again that 
inequality increased for each group of households, but here too there was a 
difference in degree (Table III). The landless group experienced the least increase 
in inequality – just 6 percentage points, well below the rural average of 10 points. 
For the next higher group, called the functionally landless, the increase in 
inequality was exactly equal to the rural average, and for each of the three higher 
groups it was more than the average. Thus, while every landownership group was 
afflicted by the phenomenon of widening inequality, the truly land-poor ones (i.e. 
the landless and the functionally landless) experienced it rather less than the 
landowning class. 
 
                                                 
8 Households whose occupation is categorised as “others” depend mainly on rents, 
remittances, pension, interest income, etc. 
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TABLE III 
INCOME INEQUALITY WITHIN LANDOWNERSHIP GROUPS: 2000-2010 
Gini Coefficient by Landownership Status 2000 2010 
Landless 0.35 0.41 
Functionally landless 0.32 0.42 
Marginal farmer 0.35 0.48 
Small farmer 0.35 0.46 
Medium/Large farmer 0.39 0.52 
All 0.37 0.47 
Decomposition of Entropy Index GE(2) (%)   
Within groups  96.0 94.5 
Between groups   4.0  5.5 
Sources: The figures for 2010 are our own estimates based on InM Poverty Dynamics Survey 
2010, and the figures for 2000 were calculated by us from the raw data file of HIES 
2000. 
Notes: (1) GE(2) is a member of the class of Generalised Entropy measures of inequality – it is 
equal to the half the square of coefficient of variation. 
 (2) Landless means no agricultural land at all; functionally landless means ownership up to 
0.5 acre; a marginal farmer owns between 0.51 and 1.5 acres; a small farmer owns 
between 1.51 and 2.50 acres; and large/medium farmers own more than 2.5 acres. 
When the households are classified by the educational status of the 
household head, we find a similar pattern–—widening inequality was a common 
experience for all the groups with some variation in degree (Table IV). The 
sharpest increase in inequality is found among those who had passed the primary 
level but not completed the secondary level (16 percentage points), and the least 
increase is observed among those who had gone beyond the higher secondary 
level (3 percentage points). 
TABLE IV 
INCOME INEQUALITY WITHIN EDUCATIONAL GROUPS: 2000-2010 
Gini Coefficient by Educational Status 2000 2010 
Illiterate 0.31 0.39 
Less than primary 0.34 0.42 
Primary plus 0.34 0.50 
Secondary plus 0.38 0.46 
Higher secondary plus 0.43 0.46 
All 0.37 0.47 
Decomposition of Entropy Index GE(2) (%)   
Within groups  90.5 96.0 
Between groups 9.5 4.0 
Sources: The figures for 2010 are our own estimates based on InM Poverty Dynamics Survey 
2010, and the figures for 2000 were calculated by us from the raw data file of HIES 
2000. 
Notes:     GE(2) is a member of the class of Generalised Entropy measures of inequality – it is 
equal to the half the square of coefficient of variation. 
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Finally, when we group the households by the (old) divisions in which they 
live, we once again find that inequality has widened in every division without 
exception (Table V). Barisal, which had the lowest degree of inequality to begin 
with, and Sylhet, which had the highest, both experienced less than average 
increase in inequality over the decade, but no division was spared from the trend 
of growing inequality. 
TABLE V 
INCOME INEQUALITY WITHIN DIVISIONS: 2000-2010 
Gini coefficient by Division 2000 2010 
Barisal 0.34 0.39 
Chittagong 0.38 0.46 
Dhaka 0.37 0.49 
Khulna 0.32 0.44 
Rajshahi 0.35 0.47 
Sylhet 0.39 0.45 
All 0.37 0.47 
Decomposition of Entropy Index GE(2) (%)   
Within divisions  98.3 99.6 
Between divisions 1.7 0.4 
Sources: The figures for 2010 are our own estimates based on InM Poverty Dynamics Survey 
2010, and the figures for 2000 were calculated by us from the raw data file of HIES 2000. 
Notes:    GE(2) is a member of the class of Generalised Entropy measures of inequality – it is equal 
to the half the square of coefficient of variation. 
One conclusion presents itself starkly from the preceding discussion – 
widening of inequality was a pervasive phenomenon in rural Bangladesh, 
affecting almost every group of people regardless of their occupation, 
landownership, education and location. A few groups–—e.g., landless 
households, casual wage labourers, and households whose head had more than 
higher secondary level of education–—can be counted as exceptions, since the 
rise in inequality they experienced (3-4 percentage points increase in Gini) was 
way below the rural average (10 points). But that does not detract from the 
validity of the broad generalisation that whatever had caused the widening of 
rural inequality in the last decade was transcendental in nature, and was not 
related to specific group characteristics. 
This conclusion is further strengthened by examining the decomposition of 
inequality into within-group and between-group components, as reported in 
Tables II-V. The first point to note is that whichever way we classify the 
households, within-group inequality is by far the predominant component, 
accounting for over 90 per cent of inequality in both 2000 and 2010. These 
particular numbers are not too important by themselves as they depend very 
much on the particular measure of inequality chosen and the level of aggregation 
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chosen while forming the groups. What is more enlightening, however, is how 
the division between the two components has changed over time. There we find 
that the predominance of the within-group component has actually increased over 
the decade (with the sole exception of grouping by landownership status). This 
once again suggests that the underlying causes of widening inequality are 
essentially transcendental in nature–—permeating almost every socio-economic 
group. 
In order to identify the nature of these forces, we proceed to undertake a 
more disaggregated analysis of income distribution going beyond the aggregate 
measure of Gini coefficient. In particular, we look at the quintile distribution, 
dividing up the rural households into five equal-sized groups after arranging 
them in the ascending order of per capita income. Table VI presents some 
revealing statistics for the quintile distribution. The first column shows the 
quintile-specific growth rate of per capita real income during the period 2000-
2010.9 The next two columns provide–—for 2000 and 2010 respectively–— 
information on each quintile’s per capita income as a ratio of that of the first 
quintile (i.e., the bottom 20 per cent of the population). 
The first point to note from this table is that per capita incomes of richer 
quintiles increased systematically faster than those of poorer quintiles, which 
suggests that the forces behind rising inequality operated throughout the range of 
income distribution. A closer look, however, reveals that by far the strongest 
effect was felt at the very top end of the distribution. This is revealed by 
examining how the ratio of per capita incomes between the bottom quintile and 
the richer quintile changed between 2000 and 2010. As can be seen from Table 
II, while the ratio increased for each quintile it is only for the top quintile that the 
increase was really spectacular–—going up from 6.3 to 9.7; for the rest of the 
quintiles the increase was quite modest. This means that the sharp rise in income 
inequality observed during the last decade was primarily a case of the top quintile 
running away much faster than the rest of the population. 
 
 
                                                 
9 In order to calculate real incomes at 2010 prices, the nominal incomes obtained from 
2000 HIES were adjusted with a composite price index constructed by combining the 
Rural Consumer Price Index (CPI) published by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics and 
the internal price indices obtained from the HIES. For the rationale of using the 
composite index, see Appendix A2 of Osmani et al. (2011), especially footnote 13. 
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TABLE VI 
QUINTILE DISTRIBUTION OF PER CAPITA INCOME 
IN RURAL BANGLADESH: 2000 – 2010 
Ratio to 1st Quintile Quintile Annual growth rate 
2000 2010 
1 0.81 1.00 1.00 
2 1.43 1.62 1.72 
3 1.94 2.15 2.40 
4 2.62 2.95 3.53 
5 5.31 6.28 9.72 
All 3.17 2.76 3.48 
Notes and Sources: The figures for 2010 are our own estimates based on InM Poverty 
Dynamics Survey 2010, and the figures for 2000 were calculated by us from the 
raw data file of HIES 2000. 
The same phenomenon can be seen graphically with the help of the Growth 
Incidence Curve given (Figure 1), which shows the growth rates of income at the 
most disaggregated level–—for each percentile. It may be seen that for most of 
the income distribution, growth in per capita income was below the growth of 
mean income; it was only well after the 80th percentile that growth rate rises 
above the average level–—confirming that it is the top quintile that mainly 
accounts for rising income inequality. 
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This raises the question: what explains the disparate fortunes of the top 
quintile vis-á-vis the rest of the population? A clue to the answer can be found by 
examining the sources of income growth for the various quintiles. Table VII 
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gives quintile-specific growth rates of the three broad components of income—– 
namely, agricultural income, non-agricultural income and transfer income; in 
addition, it also gives growth rates of the foreign remittance component of 
transfer income in view of the rising importance of remittances for the 
Bangladesh economy.10
TABLE VII 
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF COMPONENTS OF INCOME 
BY INCOME QUINTILES: 2000 – 2010 
(per cent) 
Quintile 
 
Total 
income 
Agricultural 
income 
Non-agric 
income 
Transfer 
income 
Foreign 
remittance 
1 0.81 0.44 1.60 -0.80 -6.14 
2 1.43 2.60 0.27 1.67   0.79 
3 1.94 2.88 0.63 5.19   4.16 
4 2.62 3.79 0.79 7.00   8.38 
5 5.31 3.53 4.05 10.58 11.51 
All 3.17 2.75 1.97 8.24   9.83 
Notes and Sources: Growth rates are in per capita terms. The estimates of income for 
2010 are our own estimates based on InM Poverty Dynamics Survey 2010, and 
those for 2000 were calculated by us from the raw data file of HIES 2000. 
It may be seen from this table that the top quintile does not differ all that 
much from the next two quintiles in respect of growth of agricultural income but 
it does differ sharply in respect of both non-agricultural income and transfer 
income, especially the foreign remittance component of the latter. Foreign 
remittance has been the most rapidly growing component of rural income during 
the last decade, with its share in total income going up from 7 per cent in 2000 to 
over 15 per cent in 2010. As much as 45 per cent of the incremental per capita 
rural income between 2000 and 2010 was contributed by foreign remittance. And 
almost 90 per cent of the incremental remittance income went to the top 
quintile.11 Thus the distribution of remittance income, and to a lesser extent the 
distribution of non-agricultural income, seem to have played a major role in 
causing widening of rural inequality over the last decade. 
A Decomposition Analysis of Income Inequality 
To further assess the relative importance of different sources of income to 
widening inequality in rural Bangladesh, we undertook a Gini decomposition 
                                                 
10 In addition to foreign remittances, transfer income also includes domestic remittance, 
government transfer, and private charity. 
11 For detailed statistics on the changing structure of income and its distribution across 
quintile groups, see Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2. 
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exercise by adapting a procedure suggested by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985). This 
exercise was carried out at two levels–—first at the level of three broad 
categories of income source and then at a more disaggregated level. 
Tables VIII and IX present the results of the decomposition exercise for three 
broad categories of income source–—namely, agricultural income, non-
agricultural income, and transfer income. Table VIII shows the marginal effects 
of different sources of income on inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) 
in the years 2000 and 2010. The marginal effect is defined as the percentage 
change in Gini as a result of one per cent change in a source of income. A 
positive figure indicates that the source in question has an unequalising effect 
i.e., higher income from this source would lead to greater income inequality, 
other things remaining the same. Conversely, a negative figure indicates that the 
source of income in question has an equalising effect. One may thus surmise 
from Table VIII that agricultural income has an equalising effect on rural income 
distribution, while both non-agricultural income and transfer income have 
unequalising effects. This is true for both 2000 and 2010.  
From the point of view of dynamics of inequality, it is important to note, 
however, that while the sign of the marginal effect has remained unchanged 
during the decade of the 2000s for all three components, the magnitude of the 
effects has behaved in rather disparate ways. For agricultural income, the 
marginal effect has remained more or less the same at around 13 per cent; for 
non-agricultural income it has declined from 6.8 per cent to 1.7 per cent, while 
for transfer income it has increased sharply from 6.9 per cent to 11.9 per cent. 
Transfer income has clearly played the leading role in exacerbating income 
inequality in rural Bangladesh. Not only did it have the strongest unequalising 
effect to begin with (in 2000), the strength of its unequalising effect has also 
increased sharply over time.  
TABLE VIII 
MARGINAL EFFECT OF BROAD SOURCES OF INCOME 
TO RURAL INCOME INEQUALITY (GINI) : 2000 - 2010 
(per cent) 
Sources of income 2000 2010 
Agricultural income -13.7 -12.6 
Non-agricultural income 6.8 1.6 
Transfer income 6.9 11.1 
Notes and Sources: The figures for 2010 are our own estimates based on InM Poverty 
Dynamics Survey 2010, and the figures for 2000 were calculated by us from the 
raw data file of HIES 2000. 
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It is in fact possible to measure the extent to which the three broad 
components of income have contributed to the rise in income inequality in rural 
Bangladesh. This can be done with the help of the following formula12: 
 
 1 
where G is the Gini coefficient of overall income distribution, k (= 1, …, n) 
refers to the components or sources of income, the product GkRkSk is the 
contribution of the kth source to the overall Gini coefficient (G), Gk is the Gini 
coefficient of the distribution of income from the kth source, Rk is the correlation 
coefficient between income from the kth source and total income, and Sk is the 
share of the kth source in total income. 
To see the intuition behind this formula, note first of all that if Rk is positive, 
i.e., if income from the kth source is positively correlated with total income, any 
inequality in the distribution of income from the kth source will contribute 
positively to inequality in overall income distribution; conversely, if Rk is 
negative. The magnitude of this contribution will depend partly on the value of 
Rk itself – the higher the absolute value of Rk the bigger will be the contribution 
to overall inequality, other things remaining the same. Partly, the magnitude of 
the contribution will also depend on inequality in the distribution of income from 
the kth source (Gk) and on the share of this source in total income (Sk). Given a 
positive Rk, higher values of Gk and Sk will entail a bigger positive contribution 
to overall income inequality (G). By the same token, given a negative Rk, higher 
values of Gk and Sk will entail a bigger negative contribution to overall income 
inequality. The kth source’s contribution to overall inequality can thus be 
measured by the product GkRkSk. 
The summary results of this decomposition exercise are reported in Table 
IX.13 The first two columns show the relative contributions of the three broad 
components of income to the Gini coefficients of overall income distribution in 
the years 2000 and 2010 and the final column shows their relative contributions 
to the change in Gini between the two years.14
                                                 
12 This decomposition formula was derived by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), extending a 
procedure first suggested by Shorrocks (1982). The formula for marginal effects was 
derived by Lopez-Feldman (2006). For an intuitive explanation of the decomposition 
formula as well as an early application, see Stark et al. (1986). 
13 The detailed estimates of Gk, Rk and Sk on the basis of which these summary results are 
derived are reported in Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4. 
14 The contribution of a particular component of income to the change in Gini can be 
measured by the difference (ΔGkRkSk) of its contributions to the level of Gini between 
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It is evident that in both 2000 and 2010 non-agricultural income accounted 
for by far the largest part of the Gini coefficient, the rest being shared equally by 
agricultural income and transfer income. This means that the unequal distribution 
of non-agricultural income was mainly responsible for overall inequality in both 
the years. We are more interested, however, in the factors behind the change in 
inequality between the two years as distinct from the level of inequality in either 
year. And in that context, the picture turns out to be quite different. Over the 
decade, the contribution of non-agricultural income to the overall Gini has 
remained constant, while that of transfer income has more than doubled. As a 
result, the relative contribution of non-agricultural income has declined and that 
of transfer income has increased sharply. As the final column of Table IX shows, 
non-agricultural income contributed hardly anything to the rise in inequality 
between 2000 and 2010. Instead, transfer income accounted for as much as 80 
per cent of the rise in inequality, with the rest being accounted for by agricultural 
income.15 Transfer income is thus found to be primarily responsible for rising 
income inequality in rural Bangladesh. 
TABLE IX 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF BROAD SOURCES OF INCOME TO 
CHANGE IN RURAL INCOME INEQUALITY: 2000 - 2010 
Contribution to Gini Source of income 
2000 2010 
Contribution to 
the change in 
Gini (%) 
Agricultural income 0.078 0.097   19.0 
Non-agricultural income 0.216 0.217     0.8 
Transfer income 0.071 0.152   80.2 
Total income 0.365 0.465 100.0 
Notes and Sources: The figures for 2010 are our own estimates based on InM Poverty 
Dynamics Survey 2010, and the figures for 2000 were calculated by us from the 
raw data file of HIES 2000. 
The preceding discussion was carried out at a relatively high level of 
aggregation. In order to get a clearer picture of the drivers of inequality in rural 
                                                                                                                         
two points in time. This follows from the additivity property of equation (1). Since G = 
ΣGkRkSk, we must have ΔG = ΣΔGkRkSk. 
15 While agricultural income has an equalising effect on inequality, the strength of its 
equalising nature has weakened slightly over time–—as evidenced by the fact that the 
marginal effect has increased from -13.6 to -12.6 per cent (Table VIII). That is why 
agriculture has made a positive contribution to rising inequality.  
Bangladesh Development Studies  
 
14 
Bangladesh, we carried out a similar decomposition exercise at a disaggregated 
level. The results are reported in Table X, which shows the marginal effects on 
inequality in the years 2000 and 2010 as well as the relative contributions to the 
change in inequality over the decade.  
Considering the marginal effects first, it may be noted that wage labour–—in 
both agriculture and non-agriculture–—has the most equalising effect on rural 
income distribution. Self-employment in agriculture also has an equalising effect, 
and this effect has become even stronger over the decade. By contrast, self-
employment in non-agriculture has an unequalising effect. The same is true also 
of salary income in non-agriculture, but its effect has weakened considerably 
over the decade–—as the marginal effect has declined from 8 per cent to just 
under 3 per cent. Among the components of transfer income, both government 
transfer and private charity have equalising effects, as expected; however, 
remittance income has an unequalising effect, and this is especially true of 
foreign remittance. The unequalising effect of foreign remittance was already 
high at 7.4 per cent in 2000; by 2010 it increased further to 11.4 per cent. 
Turning now to the change in inequality, it is striking that foreign remittance 
alone accounts for 70 per cent of the rise in inequality over the decade of the 
2000s. It is thus the role of foreign remittance that lies behind our earlier finding 
that “transfer income” is primarily responsible for rising income inequality in 
rural Bangladesh. The next most important factor is self-employment in non-
agriculture, which accounts for 40 per cent of the increase in Gini. It is 
noteworthy that two other components of non-agricultural income–—namely, 
salary income and “other income”–—made a negative contribution to the change 
in Gini.16 This helped offset the positive contribution of income from self-
employment, which led to the result noted earlier (Table IX) that non-agriculture 
as a whole made almost zero contribution to the change in inequality. This should 
not, however, detract from the fact that income from self-employment in non-
agriculture did have a strong unequalising effect in rural Bangladesh, second only 
to foreign remittances. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Exactly why these components helped reduce inequality needs further investigation. 
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TABLE X 
CONTRIBUTION OF DETAILED SOURCES OF INCOME TO 
CHANGE IN INEQUALITY: 2000 - 2010 
(per cent) 
Marginal effect on Gini Source of income 
 2000 2010 
Contribution to the 
change in Gini 
Agriculture    
     Self employment  -0.7 -4.6 3.3 
     Wage labour -15.0 -10.0 6.2 
     Rental income 2.1 2.0 9.5 
Non-agriculture    
     Self employment  4.8 4.7 40.9 
     Wage labour -6.0 -5.7 3.4 
     Salary income 8.0 2.9 -24.6 
     Rental income 0.4 0.5 2.0 
     Other income -0.5 -0.8 -20.9 
Transfer    
     Foreign remittance 7.4 11.5 70.9 
     Domestic remittance 0.8 0.2 8.7 
     Government transfer -0.4 -0.1 0.8 
     Private transfer -0.9 -0.6 0.2 
Total per capita income … ... 100.0 
Notes and Sources: The figures for 2010 are our own estimates based on InM Poverty 
Dynamics Survey 2010, and the figures for 2000 were calculated by us from the 
raw data file of HIES 2000. 
Further insight into the processes of inequality can be gained by trying to 
identify the particular aspects of foreign remittance and self-employment in non-
agriculture that were responsible for rising inequality. Recall that the contribution 
of any given source of income to overall inequality depends on three parameters 
– namely, the correlation of income from that source with total income (Rk), 
inequality in the distribution of income from that source (Gk), and the share of the 
source in total income (Sk). It is, therefore, of some interest to ask how these 
three parameters have changed over time to aggravate rural inequality and, if 
possible, to identify the parameter(s) that could be held primarily responsible for 
rising inequality. 
Table XI provides the relevant information. It may be noted that there is a 
common pattern between the two main sources of income that are primarily 
responsible for widening income inequality. For both of them, there is very little 
change in the degree of inequality in their distribution across households i.e., Gk 
is fairly constant. The other two parameters, however, have changed in an 
inequality-augmenting manner. Thus, the positive correlation between the source 
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income and overall income (Rk) has gone up from 0.54 to 0.64 for self-
employment in non-agriculture and from 0.77 to 0.86 for foreign remittances. 
These two sources of income have thus become more closely aligned with overall 
income i.e., the tendency for the richer households to have greater access to these 
sources of income has increased over time. As a result, even a constant inequality 
in the source itself has translated into greater inequality overall. This effect has 
been strengthened by the fact that the shares of these sources in total income (Sk) 
have also increased at the same time. This is especially true of foreign 
remittances, whose share in rural income has doubled within a decade–—going 
up from 7 per cent in 2000 to 14 per cent 2010. 
TABLE XI 
TWO MAIN SOURCES OF WIDENING RURAL INEQUALITY: 2000 - 2010 
Rk Gk Sk Contribution to G Sources of widening 
inequality 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010 
Foreign remittance 0.77 0.86 0.96 0.95 0.07 0.15    0.15    0.27 
Self-employment in 
non-agriculture  
   0.54    0.64     0.86   0.88    0.17     0.21   0.19 0.26 
Notes and Sources: (1) Rk is the correlation coefficient between source income and 
overall income, Gk is the Gini coefficient of the source income, Sk is the share of 
the source in total income, and G is the Gini coefficient of overall income 
distribution. 
(2) The figures for 2010 are our own estimates based on InM 
Poverty Dynamics Survey 2010, and the figures for 2000 were calculated by us 
from the raw data file of HIES 2000. 
We noted earlier that widening of income inequality has been a pervasive 
phenomenon in rural Bangladesh, and we have just observed that it is the 
unequalising effect of foreign remittance, and to a lesser extent that of income 
from self-employment in non-agriculture, that has been primarily responsible for 
widening inequality. The implication must be that these two factors, and 
especially foreign remittance, have been the pervasive force that has permeated 
all socio-economic groups and aggravated the within-group inequality for most 
of them. This is in fact borne out by data. The shares of income coming from 
remittance and self-employment in non-agriculture for various socio-economic 
groups have been put together in Table XII. It may be observed that the share of 
remittance has gone up significantly over the last decade for almost all the 
groups. For many of them, the share of income from non-agricultural self-
employment has also gone up, although not as pervasively as in the case of 
remittance. Together, these two factors are responsible for the observed pervasive 
increase in inequality across the socio-economic groups. 
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TABLE XII 
SHARES OF FOREIGN REMITTANCE AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT 
IN NON-AGRICULTURE BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS: 2000-2010 
(percentage share of total income) 
Share of self-employed 
non-agricultural work  Share of foreign remittance  Socio-Economic Groups 
 2000 2010 2000 2010 
By Occupation     
    Self-employment in agriculture 10.3 10.9 10.5 14.5 
    Casual labour in agriculture  4.5  3.7  1.7  2.8 
    Self-employment in non-agriculture 63.0 65.3  2.4  4.7 
    Casual labour in non-agriculture  4.9  9.2  0.8  2.1 
    Salaried work in non-agriculture 12.3  5.4  4.6  5.3 
    Others 19.4 10.4 21.6 46.1 
By Landownership     
    Landless 24.0 28.3  8.0 11.0 
    Functionally landless 18.4 20.6  6.1 16.3 
    Marginal farmer 17.3 20.1  7.9 18.7 
    Small farmer 16.4 17.7 11.3 16.2 
    Medium/Large farmer 10.9 27.1  4.5 11.5 
By Education of Household Head     
    Illiterate 16.1 19.1  7.8 13.1 
    Less than primary 23.7 27.3  5.7 11.8 
    Primary plus 20.2 29.1  7.4 16.9 
    Secondary plus 19.5 21.6  6.2 15.8 
    Higher secondary plus 26.1 22.7  7.5  6.9 
By Division of Residence     
    Barisal 19.6 18.6  3.0 13.5 
    Chittagong 22.7 23.3 17.4 26.5 
    Dhaka 22.6 23.5  6.6 17.2 
    Khulna 17.9 23.0  0.3   5.3 
    Rajshahi 14.0 27.3  0.7   4.2 
    Sylhet 11.0 27.4 11.5 16.8 
All 19.0 24.4 7.4 13.9 
Notes and Sources: The figures for 2010 are our own estimates based on InM Poverty 
Dynamics Survey 2010, and the figures for 2000 were calculated by us from the 
raw data file of HIES 2000. For details, see Appendix tables A.3 and A.4. 
It may be recalled that a few groups were exceptions to the trend in the sense 
that for them within-group inequality increased much less than the average. We 
have highlighted these exceptions in bold italics in Table XII. It is interesting to 
observe that for most of these groups the increase in the share of foreign 
remittance was also much less than the rural average. Thus while the average 
share of foreign remittance for rural households as a whole increased by about 7 
percentage points–—the extent of increase was just over 1 percentage point for 
casual labourers in both agriculture and non-agriculture and only 3 percentage 
points for landless households. For households whose head had passed higher 
secondary level, the share of foreign remittance actually declined slightly. Not 
surprisingly, these groups came to experience much less increase in within-group 
inequality compared to the rest. 
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Not all the exceptions can be explained in these terms, though. For instance, 
looking at grouping by Division of residence, we had earlier noted two 
exceptions–—namely, Barisal and Sylhet. Of these, the case of Barisal, in 
particular, cannot be explained entirely in these terms because the share of 
foreign remittance did go up sharply there. The fact that the share of income from 
non-agricultural activities slightly declined may have mitigated it to some extent; 
yet it seems reasonable to suspect that some other factors may have been at work 
in Barisal, and to a lesser extent in Sylhet, to keep inequality from rising as fast 
as in the rest of the country (as noted earlier in Table V). On the whole, however, 
it is fair to conclude that it is the unequalising effects of foreign remittance and 
income from self-employed non-agricultural activities that explain both the 
pervasiveness of widening inequality throughout rural Bangladesh as well as 
most of the exceptions to this pattern. 
This then leads to the question: why were these two sources of income so 
unequalising in nature? A source of income will aggravate inequality if it accrues 
mainly to those who are already at the upper end of the income scale. In order to 
demonstrate that this is indeed the case with the two sources we have identified, 
one would ideally need panel data, which we do not have.17 It so happens, 
however, that the InM Poverty Dynamics Survey of 2010 contains data that can 
indirectly throw some light on this matter. The survey collected information on 
the assets owned by the households at the very inception of the household (i.e., at 
the time the household was formed), and this information can be used to identify 
the households that were better off to begin with i.e., even before they began to 
receive remittances. 
As can be seen from Table XIII, remittance-receiving households were on 
the average endowed with a much higher initial level of assets compared to those 
who do not receive any foreign remittance. Since households with higher initial 
levels of endowments are also likely to have, on the average, higher overall 
income, other things remaining the same,18 we may infer that remittance income 
happens to accrue more to those who already have higher overall income. This 
means that it is the initially better off households who were more able to benefit 
from remittance income. This is not surprising since sending people abroad 
involves an initial lumpy expenditure and the households that are better off to 
                                                 
17 Merely to demonstrate that remittance income goes mostly to those who are currently 
better off does not prove the point because they might have become better off only after 
receiving the remittance. What needs to be shown is that they were relatively better off 
even before receiving remittance, and for that we need panel data. 
18 For evidence on the close correlation between initial assets and current standard of 
living, see Osmani (2011). 
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begin with are more likely to be able to incur such expenditure. Our evidence 
shows that the positive correlation between remittance income and total income 
is in fact becoming stronger over time, as indicated by the rising value of 
parameter Rk discussed above. As the correlation has become stronger, and the 
share of remittances in total income has doubled within a decade, the flow of 
remittances from abroad has inevitably become a strongly unequalising force in 
the rural economy of Bangladesh. 
The other factor behind rising inequality–—namely, income from self-
employment in non-agricultural activities–—is less closely aligned to overall 
income than foreign remittances. However, the important point is that the degree 
of alignment is going up over time (Rk going up from 0.54 in 2000 to 0.64 in 
2010); and this trend, combined with the fact that the share of this source of 
income is also rising, has exerted an upward pressure on rural inequality. Why 
exactly the degree of alignment is going up is difficult to gauge. It is possible that 
as the rapid transformation of the economy is creating new opportunities for 
engaging in various non-agricultural pursuits, it is the better off households who 
are more able to seize those opportunities. But this is merely a hypothesis at this 
stage; further research is needed in order to test the validity of this or other 
hypotheses.19
TABLE XIII 
INITIAL ENDOWMENTS OF HOUSEHOLDS: 
RECEIVERS VERSUS NON-RECEIVERS OF FOREIGN REMITTANCE  
Initial Endowments  Receivers Non-receivers t-value 
Land (decimal)   93  65 4.9 
Non-land physical asset ('000 Taka) 317  53 4.9 
Schooling of household head (year)  4.9 3.6 7.3 
Notes and Sources: (1) Initial endowments refer to the assets owned by a household at the time the 
household was formed. 
 (2) Non-land physical assets are measured at the constant prices of 2010. 
 (3) Data are from the InM Poverty Dynamics Survey 2010. 
III. STABILITY IN CONSUMPTION INEQUALITY: AN EXPLANATION 
We now turn to the puzzling phenomenon that during the last decade 
inequality in consumption has remained virtually unchanged in spite of sharply 
rising inequality in income. To the extent that the marginal propensity to 
                                                 
19 In particular, one would need to have access to panel data, which are currently not 
available. The InM Poverty Dynamics Study intends to undertake panel surveys every 
three years starting from 2010. As and when data from these surveys become available, it 
would be possible to examine more effectively issues of the kind raised above. 
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consume falls at higher levels of income, it is plausible that consumption 
inequality would not rise as much as income inequality. But that alone cannot 
explain why consumption inequality should not change at all. For that to happen, 
the propensity to consume must rise at the bottom end of the scale at the same 
time that the propensity to consume falls at the top, so that the relative 
consumption distribution may remain unchanged in the face of rising income 
inequality. This has indeed happened, as we shall presently see. The question is 
why has the propensity to consume risen at the lower end? We offer an 
explanation in terms of gradual relaxation of liquidity constraint over time. 
Let us first consider the dynamics of consumption and saving behaviour in 
rural Bangladesh during the last decade. As can be seen from Table XIV, the 
overall savings rate in rural Bangladesh has gone up impressively–—from 14 per 
cent in 2000 to 22 per cent in 2010, but this has been driven mainly by the top 
quintile, whose savings rate has shot up from 32 to 54 per cent. During the same 
period, the top quintile has also enjoyed a huge increase in per capita income, 
which went up from Tk 43,000 to Tk 76,000 per annum (at constant prices of 
2010), helped mainly by foreign remittances, as we have noted before. With 
increases in income of this order of magnitude, a sharp fall in the rate of 
consumption–—and correspondingly a sharp rise in the rate of savings–—is not 
at all implausible.20  
What is more remarkable, however, is what has happened at the bottom end 
of the scale. As can be seen from Table XIV, there has been a very sharp increase 
in the rate of dissaving (negative savings) by the bottom quintiles. As a 
consequence, the rate of consumption has risen much faster for the bottom 
quintiles as compared to the top. In real terms the consumption level of the 
bottom quintile has increased by almost 4 per cent per annum as against less than 
2 per cent for the top quintile. In fact, the rate of growth in consumption is seen 
to fall systematically for the richer quintiles–—in a mirror image of what has 
happened to the rate of growth in income. The Growth Incidence Curve for 
consumption expenditure shows this picture vividly (Figure 2), where, in contrast 
to the Growth Incidence Curve for income shown in section II (Figure 1), the rate 
of growth of consumption falls almost throughout the spectrum. It is this sharp 
rise in consumption at the lower levels of income–—made possible by increased 
                                                 
20 This can happen with or without a decline in the marginal propensity to consume. Even 
if the marginal propensity remains unchanged, the average rate of consumption will still 
fall–—and correspondingly the rate of savings (i.e., savings as a ratio of income) will 
still rise–—so long as there is an autonomous element in the consumption function, as is 
always allowed for in standard specifications of the short-run consumption function. 
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negative savings–—that has mainly prevented consumption inequality from 
rising despite very sharp rise in income inequality. 
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Therefore, in order to explain the observed stability in consumption 
inequality we need to explain the reasons behind increased rates of negative 
saving on the part of the bottom quintiles. The phenomenon of negative saving – 
i.e., consuming more than the income earned–—is in fact quite common at lower 
levels of income and is perfectly consistent with inter-temporal optimisation 
behaviour. When faced with income shocks that bring current income below 
some notion of a “permanent income” that people might have, they may 
rationally choose to dissave or borrow at present with the intention of balancing 
it with savings out of higher income in good times in the future, so that they may 
maintain a smooth pattern of consumption over time.21 What needs to be 
explained, however, is why has the rate of negative saving by the bottom 
quintiles increased so sharply over the last decade? If income falls in absolute 
terms the rate of negative saving may of course rise, but that is not what has 
actually happened. Income inequality may have increased but this does not mean 
that the poor have become poorer in absolute terms. In reality, even the bottom 
quintiles have experienced positive growth of real income, albeit at a much 
slower rate than the top quintiles (Table XIV). With higher real incomes, they 
                                                 
21 For evidence on such consumption smoothing on the part of the poor, see, among 
others, Collins et al. (2009) and the references cited therein. 
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would have been expected to save more and thereby bring down the rate of 
negative savings22; instead they have done the opposite.  
TABLE XIV 
SAVINGS RATES AND GROWTH OF INCOME AND CONSUMPTION 
BY INCOME QUINTILES: 2000 AND 2010 
(per cent per annum) 
Rate of savings 
(per cent) 
Rate of growth 
(per cent per annum) 
Quintile 
2000 2010 Income Consumption 
1 -0.45 -0.91 0.81 3.63 
2 -0.01 -0.24 1.43 3.45 
3 0.05 -0.05 1.94 2.99 
4 0.13  0.12 2.62 2.78 
5 0.32  0.50 5.31 2.05 
All 0.14  0.19 3.17 2.61 
Notes and Sources: The figures for 2010 are our own estimates based on InM Poverty 
Dynamics Survey 2010, while those for 2000 were calculated by us from the raw 
data file of HIES 2000. 
Why has this happened? One possible explanation lies in the relaxation of 
liquidity constraint made possible by rapid expansion of microcredit during the 
last decade. Very briefly, the argument goes as follows. The consumption and 
saving behaviour that was observed in 2000 was heavily conditioned by the 
stringent liquidity constraint that the poor people had to face. This constraint 
arose partly because they owned very little liquid assets and partly because they 
did not have access to credit at affordable rates of interest. Due to this constraint, 
when some of the poor people faced a negative income shock and their actual 
income fell below permanent income, they could not undertake the “desired” 
level of negative savings that was required by inter-temporal optimisation. Thus, 
the relatively low rate of negative saving that we observe at the bottom end of 
income distribution in 2000 was not made out of choice; rather it was forced by 
the lack of access to borrowing. The next decade has witnessed an explosion of 
microcredit that has resulted in a significant easing of the liquidity constraint 
faced by the rural poor. As a result, poor people who end up with unusually low 
incomes because of negative income shocks can now get closer to the “optimum” 
level of borrowing and maintain their consumption level in line with permanent 
                                                 
22 Cross-sectionally (as distinct from over time), the rate of negative saving does go down 
at higher levels of income, as can be seen from Table XIV. 
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income, and our hypothesis is that this is what is reflected in higher rates of 
negative saving at the bottom end of income distribution in 2010. 
What evidence can be offered in support of this hypothesis? A direct test of 
the hypothesis would require information on how liquidity constraint has actually 
changed at the household level over the last decade. It should be emphasized that 
the mere fact that the extent of borrowing by poor households has gone up over 
the last decade does not by itself constitute conclusive proof that the liquidity 
constraint has eased. For, expansion of credit can occur without a corresponding 
easing of the liquidity constraint. For example, it is possible that people’s desired 
borrowing was itself going up, presumably because of rising income, and that 
actual borrowing was merely keeping pace with it. In that case, the fact of credit 
expansion cannot by itself be interpreted as evidence that the liquidity constraint 
has eased. For such interpretation to be valid, it is first necessary to demonstrate 
that there existed a liquidity constraint in 2000–—in the form of a gap between 
desired and actual borrowing–—and that the gap has become smaller by 2010. 
The kind of information that is necessary to arrive at such a judgement can in 
principle be collected through properly designed household-level surveys, but 
unfortunately they do not actually exist for the time period under consideration.23
This means that a direct test of our hypothesis is not possible. We have, 
however, devised an indirect test that bypasses the need for actually estimating 
the extent of liquidity constraint. Our test requires only the estimation of a 
consumption function–—a relationship between household consumption and 
household income, and we do have surveys for the relevant period that contain 
the information necessary for this purpose. For 2010, we can use the InM Poverty 
Dynamics Survey and for 2000 we can use the Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (HIES) of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics–—the same 
two surveys that we used earlier for studying income inequality in section II. 
An Indirect Test of the Hypothesis of Softening Liquidity Constraint 
Our strategy is first to develop a testable hypothesis about the shapes of 
consumption functions under different degrees of liquidity constraint and then to 
check if this hypothesis is borne out by the experience of the last decade. We 
shall first demonstrate theoretically that the shapes of the aggregate consumption 
function would change in a predictable way as the economy moves from a 
scenario of a stringent liquidity constraint to a scenario of a less stringent one. 
We shall then demonstrate that between 2000 and 2010 the aggregate 
                                                 
23 A Survey on Access to Financial Services carried out by the Institute of Microfinance 
(InM) in 2010 does contain the information required to estimate the degree of liquidity 
constraint in that year, but there is no comparable survey for 2000 or thereabout. 
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consumption function did change in the way predicted by theory, which would 
constitute an indirect evidence that the liquidity constraint faced by the rural 
people of Bangladesh has indeed become more relaxed over the decade. 
In Figure 3, the line AB represents the “unconstrained” short-run 
consumption function–—the one that would prevail without any liquidity 
constraint. In line with the permanent income hypothesis, households whose 
actual income falls below their permanent income would resort to negative 
saving if they did not face any liquidity constraint. In Figure 3, such households 
have actual incomes below Y* and their consumption levels lie on the segment 
AF of the AB line. However, if some of these households face a binding liquidity 
constraint, they will not be able to operate on the AB line as their consumption 
will fall short of the desired level; how short would depend on how strongly the 
liquidity constraint binds. 
Assume (without loss of generality) that households with permanent income 
up to Y′ face a binding liquidity constraint, and those with permanent income 
above Y′ do not.24 Now consider the set of all households whose current (as 
distinct from permanent) income lies below Y′. This set can be thought of being 
composed of two distinct subsets. The first subset comprises those households 
whose permanent income is above Y′ but because of some negative income 
shock their actual income has fallen below Y′. The second subset consists of 
those households for whom both permanent and actual incomes are below Y′. By 
denoting actual income by Y and permanent income by Yp, and using i to denote 
the ith household, we can formally define these two subsets as follows: 
S1 = (∀i⎪Yi < Y′ < Yip) (2) 
S2 = (∀i⎪Yi < Y′ and Yip < Y′) (3) 
S2 can be further subdivided into two parts depending on whether actual 
income falls short of or exceeds permanent income: 
S2a = (∀i⎪Yi < Yip < Y′) (4) 
S2b = (∀i⎪Yip < Yi < Y′) (5) 
                                                 
24 Y′ could be interpreted as the poverty line, but it need not be. It is quite some possible 
that the moderately poor people do have access to credit and only the extremely poor 
don’t, in which case Y′ would be below the poverty line; on the other hand, it is also 
possible that the liquidity constraint extends even to some of the marginally non-poor 
people, in which case Y′ would be above the poverty line. For our purposes, it doesn’t 
really matter exactly where Y′ is, so long as it divides the entire population into two 
groups such that those with permanent income below it face liquidity constraint and those 
above it don’t. 
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FIGURE 3: Consumption and Saving Behaviour with and without Liquidity Constraint 
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By assumption, households in the first subset S1 do not face any liquidity 
constraint; therefore, their consumption will lie on the line segment AD. 
Households belonging to S2 do face a liquidity constraint, and for simplicity of 
exposition we make the extreme assumption that they do not have access to 
credit at all nor do they have any liquid assets to dispose of. Therefore, when 
their actual income falls short of permanent income–—as in the case of S2a–— 
they are obliged to consume exactly what they earn i.e., their consumption will 
lie on the line segment OE along the 45° line. What happens when their actual 
income exceeds permanent income–—as in the case of S2b–—is slightly trickier 
to gauge. In principle, they could save a large part of the difference between 
E
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actual and permanent incomes so that it may be used in bad times i.e., when they 
find themselves in S2a. However, there is enough evidence that poor people find 
it very difficult to save up front without some kind of compulsion – such as the 
compulsion to repay debts25, so that one may assume that people belonging to S2b 
also consume what they earn i.e., their consumption will also lie on the line 
segment OE as in the case of S2a. 
We thus have two types of consumption behaviour by households whose 
actual income falls below Y′ (Yi < Y′). There are some (S1) who do not face 
liquidity constraint and their consumption function will be represented by the line 
segment AD. And there are others (S2) who do face a liquidity constraint and 
their consumption function will be represented by the line segment OE. The 
combined consumption function of all those with Yi < Y′ will be a weighted 
average of AD and OE – for example, a line segment such as A′D′. As for those 
with Yi > Y′, the relevant consumption function is the line segment DB. Thus, for 
the population as a whole, the aggregate consumption function will be a step 
function involving the segments A′D′ and DB.  
We can now analyse the consequences of relaxing the liquidity constraint. If 
more and more people have access to credit over time, i.e., if the liquidity 
constraint is relaxed, the subset S2 will gradually shrink and the subset S1 will 
expand. Therefore, the segment A′D′, which is a weighted average of AD (the 
consumption function of S2) and OE (the consumption function of S1), will 
gradually converge to AD, and the aggregate consumption function for the 
population as a whole will converge to AB. Our hypothesis is that this is what 
has happened in rural Bangladesh over the last decade, thanks to the rapid 
expansion of microcredit. In other words, we postulate that the situation in 2000 
was closer to the step function A′D′-DB, whereas the situation in 2010 was closer 
to the smooth function AB. 
One way of testing this hypothesis is to note the differences one would 
expect to observe if one were to try to fit empirically a linear consumption 
function under the two alternative scenario of with and without liquidity 
constraint. The linear regression line fitted to the data under the (relatively) 
unconstrained scenario will approximate the line AB, whereas a linear regression 
line fitted to the constrained scenario (where the step function A′D′-DB 
represents the underlying consumption function) would resemble the line RR′. 
The difference between the two regression lines is that the unconstrained line 
(AB) would have a higher intercept and a smaller slope than the constrained line 
(RR′).  
                                                 
25 For the relevant evidence and insightful discussion on the theoretical issues arising out 
of it, see Banarjee and Duflo (2011) and Collins et al. (2009).  
Osmani & Sen:  Inequality in Rural Bangladesh in the 2000s 27
We thus arrive at the testable hypothesis that a linear regression line fitted to 
the data for 2010 will have a higher intercept and a smaller slope compared to a 
linear regression line fitted to the data for 2000. In order to test this hypothesis, 
we fitted two linear consumption functions to the data of 2000 and 2010 within 
the same range of income,26 and the results can be seen in Table XV. It is evident 
that the results strongly support the hypothesis: the estimated intercept is 
considerably higher for 2010 and the slope is smaller, and all the coefficients are 
highly statistically significant. 
TABLE XV 
ESTIMATED AGGREGATE CONSUMPTION FUNCTIONS: 2000 AND 2010 
Variable 
Constant 
Coefficient Std. error t-value P > |t| 95% conf. interval 
      2000 5394 155.4 34.7 0.000 5089 5698 
      2010 11221 237.4 47.3 0.000 10756 11687 
Per capita income       
      2000 0.5948 0.00788 75.4 0.000 0.5793 0.6103 
      2010 0.4529 0.01029 44.0 0.000 0.4327 0.4731 
Notes and Sources: (1) The figures for 2010 are our own estimates based on InM Poverty Dynamics Survey 
2010, while those for 2000 were calculated by us from the raw data file of HIES 2000. 
(2) The regression for 2000 was run after converting all figures into constant prices of  
2010, in order to ensure comparability of the intercept term. 
For a more vivid picture, we plotted the two estimated regression lines in 
Figure 4. It is indeed striking how the estimated line for 2010 resembles the 
theoretical unconstrained regression line AB in Figure 3 and the estimated line 
for 2000 resembles the theoretical constrained regression line RR′.27 The 
evidence is thus consistent with the hypothesis that over the last decade liquidity 
constraint faced by the rural people has eased considerably. 
                                                 
26The chosen range was up to Tk 60,000 per capita per year in the constant prices of 
2010. This range covers close to 98 per cent of the sample of 2000 and 92 per cent of the 
sample of 2010. The main reason for this truncation was that if there is any nonlinearity 
in consumption function then, in view of the very large increases in income that occurred 
at the top end of the distribution in 2010, fitting linear regressions across the entire range 
might cause too much distortion to allow proper testing of our hypothesis. In any case, 
since we are interested in testing differences in constrained and unconstrained behaviour 
at given (low) levels of income, it makes sense to restrict the comparison to the same 
(relatively low) range of incomes. 
27We are not suggesting that the estimated line for 2010 is the exact empirical counterpart 
of the theoretical unconstrained line AB, because it is possible that the liquidity constraint 
still remained binding for some of the poor people in 2010. The only claim is that it is a 
closer approximation of the theoretical unconstrained line than the one estimated for 
2000. 
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Estimated Consumption Function: 2000 & 2010
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FIGURE 4: 
 
It is thus fair to conclude that the relaxation of liquidity constraint made 
possible by rapid expansion of microcredit over the last decade has allowed 
people at the lower end of the income scale to better achieve their optimum level 
of consumption smoothing. This has entailed much higher levels of consumption 
for given levels of income in 2010 as compared with 2000, as reflected in higher 
rates of negative saving at low levels of income. The resulting more-than-
proportionate increase in consumption at the lower end of the income scale in 
2010 is a plausible explanation of why consumption inequality has remained 
stable despite a sharp increase in income inequality during the last decade.28
                                                 
28 While this explanation gives credit to the expansion of microcredit for ensuring stability in 
consumption inequality, it should be emphasized that the present analysis does not fully 
account for the distributional impact of microcredit. In principle, microcredit can influence the 
distribution of consumption through two channels – namely, income augmentation and 
consumption smoothing. The present analysis has only considered the channel of consumption 
smoothing (at given levels of income), whereby borrowers use part or whole of the loan to 
finance consumption. Recent evidence shows that over half of the microcredit borrowers do 
use credit for this purpose (Osmani et al. 2011); so consumption smoothing is clearly an 
important channel. However, nearly half of the borrowers use their loan mainly for directly 
productive purposes, and it has been shown through careful econometric analysis that they are 
on the whole able to raise their living standards by augmenting their income and consumption 
(Osmani 2011). This additional channel will have to be taken into account in any complete 
analysis of the distributional impact of microcredit. We have not considered this channel here 
because it was not germane to our purpose. In so far as microcredit goes mainly to the poor 
people, the income augmentation channel will serve to counter the effect of rising income 
inequality that stems from other forces (such as remittance), and to that extent it will also 
serve to soften the consequent widening of consumption inequality, but it cannot explain 
stability in consumption inequality in the face of widening income inequality. For that we 
need some explanation of increased negative savings at the bottom of the income scale and 
only the consumption smoothing channel of microcredit is relevant in that context. 
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has investigated the patterns of inequality that have emerged in 
rural Bangladesh in the decade of the 2000s. Two findings stand out clearly–— 
distribution of income has become more unequal over the decade, and, somewhat 
surprisingly, distribution of consumption has remained more or less unchanged 
despite widening income inequality. Both these trends are continuation of a 
pattern that was already emerging in the 1990s, and have been noted by others 
before. The main analytical task of the paper was to search for the underlying 
forces responsible for these two apparently contradictory trends. 
The trend of widening income inequality was found to be a pervasive 
phenomenon, afflicting nearly all segments of the rural population. When the 
households were classified into a number of groups by different criteria–—such 
as occupation, or landownership, or education, or geographical location–— 
almost all the groups were found to have witnessed increased inequality over the 
decade, with a few notable exceptions. By breaking up overall inequality into 
within-group and between-group components, it was observed that it was mainly 
the within-group component that was increasing over the decade, whichever way 
the households were classified. The implication is that the forces causing 
widening inequality were essentially transcendental in nature cutting across all 
types of households rather than tied to specific characteristics such as occupation, 
landownership, education or location. 
The search for these transcendental forces led us to turn our attention away 
from groups classified by specific characteristics towards income groups, as they 
include households with all different characteristics. It was observed that the 
widening of the overall income inequality was the result primarily of the income 
of the top quintile (i.e., richest 20 per cent of the households) running away much 
faster than the rest of the population. Probing into the sources of income growth, 
it was found that the main difference of the top quintile from the rest lay in the 
especially sharp growth they enjoyed from two particular sources–—namely, 
foreign remittances and self-employed non-agricultural activities. Of the two, 
foreign remittance played by far the bigger role. As much as 45 per cent of the 
incremental rural income between 2000 and 2010 was contributed by foreign 
remittance, and almost 90 per cent of the incremental remittance income went to 
the top quintile. 
An analysis of the marginal effects of different components of income on 
overall inequality showed that both foreign remittance and income from self-
employment in non-agriculture were highly unequalising in nature, i.e., any 
increase in their share of income would lead to greater inequality, other things 
remaining the same. As it happened, the shares of both these components did 
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increase markedly over the decade–—from 7 to 14 per cent for foreign 
remittance and from 19 to over 24 per cent for self-employment in non-
agricultural activities. Moreover, the unequalising marginal effect of remittance 
itself increased over time. All these forces have combined to aggravate rural 
inequality. A decomposition analysis showed that foreign remittance alone 
accounted for about 70 per cent of the increase in inequality between 2000 and 
2010, and self-employed non-agricultural activities accounted for 40 per cent.29
Thus, it is the unequalising effect of foreign remittance, and to a lesser extent 
that of income from self-employment in non-agriculture, that has been primarily 
responsible for widening inequality. These two forces have permeated all the 
socio-economic groups and aggravated within-group inequality for most of them. 
The share of remittance has gone up significantly for almost all the groups. For 
many of them, the share of income from self-employment has also gone up, 
although not as pervasively as in the case of remittance. Together, these two 
factors are thus clearly responsible for the observed pervasive increase in 
inequality across the socio-economic groups. 
The unequalising effect of foreign remittance stems from the fact that 
sending people abroad involves an initial lumpy expenditure and that it is the 
initially better off households that are more likely to be able to incur such 
expenditure. Our analysis reveals that remittance-receiving households were on 
the average endowed with a much higher initial level of assets compared to those 
who did not receive any foreign remittance. This suggests that remittance income 
tends to accrue more to those who already have higher overall income, which 
makes the increased flow of remittance an unequalising force. Why income from 
self-employment in non-agricultural activities also tends to be unequalising is 
more difficult to gauge. It is possible that as the rapid transformation of the 
economy creates new opportunities for engaging in various non-agricultural 
pursuits, it is the better off households who are more able to seize those 
opportunities. But this is merely a hypothesis at this stage; further research is 
needed to throw light on this issue. 
The second part of the paper was concerned with explaining the observed 
stability in consumption inequality. Widening income inequality should normally 
have been associated with widening consumption inequality as well by raising 
                                                 
29 While their contributions add up to more than 100 per cent, this was balanced by a 
couple of other sources of income (such as salary income and ‘other income’), which 
made a negative contribution to the change in inequality. 
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consumption more at the upper end of the scale. This did not happen; instead it 
was actually at the lower end of the income scale that consumption increased 
faster, leading to increased rates of negative savings at low income levels. Any 
explanation of the observed stability in consumption inequality will have to 
explain why and how did the households at the lower end of the distribution 
resort to increased rates of negative savings. 
Our own explanation runs in terms of a possible relaxation of the liquidity 
constraint faced by poor consumers, which was made possible by rapid 
expansion of microcredit during the last decade. The argument goes as follows. 
The consumption and saving behaviour that was observed in 2000 was heavily 
conditioned by the stringent liquidity constraint that the poor people had to face. 
Due to this constraint, when some of the poor people faced a negative income 
shock and their actual income fell below permanent income, they could not 
undertake the “esired” level of negative savings that was required by inter-
temporal optimisation. Thus, the relatively low rate of negative saving that we 
observe at the bottom end of income distribution in 2000 was not made out of 
choice; rather it was forced by the lack of access to borrowing. The next decade 
has witnessed an explosion of microcredit that has resulted in a significant easing 
of the liquidity constraint faced by the rural poor. As a result, poor people who 
end up with unusually low incomes because of negative income shocks can now 
get closer to the “optimum” level of borrowing and maintain their consumption 
level in line with permanent income, and our hypothesis is that this is what is 
reflected in higher rates of negative saving at the bottom end of income 
distribution in 2010. 
A direct test of this hypothesis was not possible because of lack of data on 
liquidity constraints at the two ends of the decade. However, we devised an 
indirect test based on aggregate consumption function. First, it was demonstrated 
theoretically that the shapes of the aggregate consumption function would change 
in a predictable way if the economy moves from a scenario of a stringent 
liquidity constraint to a scenario of a less stringent one. It was then empirically 
shown that between 2000 and 2010 the aggregate consumption function did 
change in the way predicted by theory, which constitutes an indirect evidence 
that the liquidity constraint faced by the rural people of Bangladesh did indeed 
become more relaxed over the decade. 
Therefore, it is plausible to argue that the relaxation of liquidity constraint 
made possible by rapid expansion of microcredit over the last decade has allowed 
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people at the lower end of the income scale to better achieve their optimum level 
of consumption smoothing. This has entailed much higher levels of consumption 
for given levels of income in 2010 as compared with 2000, as reflected in higher 
rates of negative saving at low levels of income. The resulting more-than-
proportionate increase in consumption at the lower end of the income scale in 
2010 is a plausible explanation of why consumption inequality has remained 
stable despite a sharp increase in income inequality during the last decade.30
We may conclude by noting a couple of policy implications of the findings of 
the paper. First, one of our major findings was that the two main factors that 
drove the growth of the rural economy–—namely, foreign remittance and income 
from self-employment in non-agricultural activities–—were also the factors that 
were mainly responsible for widening rural inequality. There would thus appear 
to exist a trade-off between growth and equity in rural Bangladesh. But the 
existence of this trade-off does not have to be accepted as immutable for policy 
purposes. Increased flow of remittances must be encouraged by all means, but in 
order to avoid, or at least to minimize, the trade-off, attempts must be made at the 
same time to ensure that people with small means are also able to access 
remittance income. At present, remittance tends to be unequalising because it is 
mostly the better off households who are able to incur the initial lumpy 
expenditure that has to be incurred in order to send people abroad. Policies 
should aim firstly at reducing the size of initial expenses by removing the 
varieties of transaction costs that people often face in arranging migration, and 
secondly at offering credit facilities to those who cannot afford to incur the 
lumpy expenditure but are otherwise able and willing to undertake migration. 
                                                 
30 It should be noted that our hypothesis does not imply that microcredit borrowers are 
sustaining higher consumption by accumulating debts because our argument does not rest on 
the idea of permanent or repeated borrowing. On the contrary, the scenario we are considering 
is one where only people with temporarily low incomes (i.e., lower than permanent income) 
borrow in order to maintain their ‘normal’ level of consumption, repaying the loan in good 
times by making additional savings; so, the question of accumulating debt does not arise. This 
of course raises the question: then how does loan-financed negative saving persist over the 
years? The answer lies in noting that negative income shocks strike randomly, afflicting 
different sets of people at different times, so that the set of people who face unexpectedly low 
incomes would vary from year to year. In other words, there would be a good deal of churning 
at the lower end of the income scale, and therefore the set of borrowers is not constant from 
year to year. Every year, even as old borrowers repay their loan, new victims of negative 
income shocks become new borrowers and keep up the high rate of loan-financed negative 
savings at the aggregate level. 
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Our second major finding was regarding the role of microcredit in ensuring 
stability of consumption inequality by allowing better opportunities for 
consumption smoothing. Stability in consumption distribution has played an 
important role in the recent past in translating satisfactory rates of economic 
growth into equally satisfactory rates of poverty reduction.31 Whether growth 
will continue to have strong poverty-reducing effect in the future depends very 
much on whether consumption inequality continues to remain stable or not. If our 
explanation of stability in terms of microcredit is valid, this in turn would depend 
on whether microcredit continues to soften the liquidity constraint further. There 
are, however, reasons to be skeptical on this score. Recent evidence shows that 
the expansion of microcredit has reached a stage where further expansion will not 
be easy (Osmani et al. 2011). If the expansion of microcredit slows down, so will 
the pace at which liquidity constraint is relaxed. In that event, consumption 
inequality will no longer remain stable in the face of widening income inequality. 
As income inequality increases, so will consumption inequality, which will 
weaken the poverty-reducing effect of growth.  
So far, widening of income inequality has not posed an obstacle to poverty 
reduction in rural Bangladesh because microcredit has served to decouple 
consumption distribution from income distribution by increasing the scope for 
consumption smoothing, and it is the distribution of consumption that matters for 
poverty. As soon as the expansion of microcredit slows down, this decoupling 
will cease to exist and consumption distribution will begin to follow the path of 
income distribution. Increased income inequality will then become a matter of 
serious concern not only in its own right but also for the sake of poverty 
reduction. Therefore, if the policymakers are serious about pro-poor growth, they 
will have to be serious about tackling income inequality as well. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Since poverty is typically measured with reference to consumption levels, constancy in 
consumption inequality implies that any growth in average income is reflected into almost 
proportionate decline in poverty. On recent records on growth and poverty reduction, see 
Osmani (2011).  
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APPENDIX TABLE A.1 
QUINTILE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BY SOURCES OF INCOME IN 
RURAL BANGLADESH: 2000 
(per capita annual income) 
Quintile 
 
Total 
Income 
Agricultural 
income 
Non-
agricultural 
income 
Transfer 
income 
Foreign 
remittance 
1   7202   4117   2648   437    67 
2 11670   5071   5840   760   178 
3 15456   6106   8233 1117   435 
4 21281   7328 11879 2074 1113 
5 45232 12440 25166 7627 5802 
All 19877   6948 10581 2348 1475 
Notes and Sources: (1) Our estimates from the raw data file of HIES 2000. 
(2) Per capita annual income is at 2010 prices. A reflator of 1.87 was used to 
convert 2000 figures into 2010 prices. 
APPENDIX TABLE A.2 
QUINTILE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BY SOURCES OF INCOME IN 
RURAL BANGLADESH: 2010 
(per capita annual income) 
Quintile 
 
Total 
Income 
Agricultural 
income 
Non-
agricultural 
income 
Transfer 
income 
Foreign 
remittance 
1   7811   4302   3105   404    35 
2 13450   6556   5997   897   193 
3 18730   8112   8765  1853   653 
4 27559 10626 12852  4081  2488 
5 75882 17590 37448 20843 17247 
All 27155   9110 12864  5181  3766 
Notes and Sources: (1) The estimates are based on InM Poverty Dynamics Survey 2010. 
 (2) Per capita annual income is at 2010 prices. 
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APPENDIX  TABLE A.3 
GINI DECOMPOSITION OF RURAL INCOME  BY SOURCE OF INCOME: 
2000 (per capita income) 
 Sk Gk Rk 
Agriculture 0.3498 0.5742 0.3884 
     Self employment  0.2012 0.7411 0.4772 
     Wage labour 0.1145 0.7779 -0.1481 
     Rental income 0.0341 0.9358 0.6277 
Non-agriculture 0.5236 0.5764 0.7154 
     Self employment  0.1728 0.8587 0.5418 
     Wage labour 0.0800 0.8884 0.1050 
     Salary income 0.1289 0.8976 0.6597 
     Rental income 0.0066 0.9835 0.6184 
     Other income 0.1353 0.6288 0.5610 
Transfer 0.1266 0.8788 0.6379 
     Foreign remittance 0.0705 0.9624 0.7684 
     Domestic remittance 0.0402 0.9268 0.4751 
     Government transfer 0.0029 0.9574 -0.1468 
     Private transfer 0.0131 0.9324 0.1274 
Total income (per capita) 1.0000 0.3649  
Notes and Sources: (1) Our estimates from the raw data file of HIES 2000. 
(2) Sk stands for the share of each source of income in total income, Gk refers 
to the Gini coefficient of the distribution of source income, and Rk stands for the Gini correlation of 
income from source k with the distribution of total income.  
APPENDIX TABLE A.4 
GINI DECOMPOSITION OF RURAL INCOME  
BY SOURCE OF INCOME: 2010 
(per capita income) 
 Sk Gk Rk
Agriculture 0.3348 0.5728 0.5061 
     Self employment  0.2065 0.6618 0.4772 
     Wage labour 0.0845 0.8009 -0.1481 
     Rental income 0.0438 0.9414 0.6277 
Non-agriculture 0.4501 0.6694 0.7193 
     Self employment  0.2144 0.8822 0.5418 
     Wage labour 0.0807 0.8670 0.1050 
     Salary income 0.0821 0.9413 0.6597 
     Rental income 0.0079 0.9910 0.6184 
     Other income 0.0651 0.6522 0.5610 
Transfer 0.2151 0.8950 0.7869 
     Foreign remittance 0.1506 0.9482 0.7684 
     Domestic remittance 0.0545 0.9398 0.4751 
     Government transfer 0.0014 0.9962 -0.1468 
     Private transfer 0.0086 0.9415 0.1274 
Total income (per capita) 1.0000 0.4635  
Notes and Sources: (1) The estimates are based on InM Poverty Dynamics Survey 2010. 
(2) Sk stands for the share of each source of income in total income, 
Gk refers to the Gini coefficient of the distribution of source income, and Rk stands for 
the Gini correlation of income from source k with the distribution of total income. 
